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I
The Rome Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (E.E.C.)
provides for a number of measures designed to establish an economic union between
the signatory countries and make possible a more economic allocation of resources
within the Community. This, in turn, would, it was hoped, increase the over-all
productivity within the region comprised by the six participating countries-in-
cluding certain overseas areas. The establishment of a customs union was envisaged
as only one of the measures to be employed for these purposes; but, so far,' this is
the only task of "harmonization" that has reached the first stages of realization. On
January i, ig6, tariffs on a large group of imports from member countries were
reduced by a further ten per cent, after two previous reductions of the same pro-
portion. At the same time a first step towards a common external tariff went into
effect-i.e., each one of the four customs areas of the unionla began to apply on im-
ports from nonmember countries a tariff which is thirty per cent closer to the com-
mon tariff provided for in the Rome Treaty.
This change in the tariff structure of the world's most intensive trading area is
often regarded as an event which will have the most direct and obvious effect upon
the relationship between the E.E.C. and the rest of the world. Any prediction as to
the scope of this effect, however, is based largely on static models-i.e., on the analysis
of cost-price-quantity relationships under extremely limiting assumptions as to
market structure and income changes. Therefore, whatever tendencies or effects
such models may indicate are meaningful only in the context of an extremely
special case. At best, they give an indication of the direction of change to be expected
from changes in tariffs; but the "tendencies" revealed by static models lack the
significance of those which in reality connect different stages of economic processes
over a period of time. In short, these models have only logical, rather than real-
time dimensions.
Apart from the problem of prediction, one might wonder at the comparative
ease with which the treaty countries have found agreement on the bulk of tariff
items. If it could be argued that the establishment of the customs union was easier
than the implementation of other features of economic union, one might well suggest
that apparently less powerful economic obstacles were encountered in its course.
Turning this argument around, this would suggest that the economic effects of
0 Discussioff and critique of this paper by Professors Fred Joerg, Thomas Keller, and especially Robert
S. Smith, all of Duke University, are gratefully acknowledged as major aids in its preparation.
t Dr. rer. pol. 1958, Tiibingen University (Germany). Assistant Professor, Department of Economics,
Duke University.
"Winter 196o-61.
U Benelux (Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) enters as one customs area.
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customs union were expected to bear relatively less on the distribution of economic
gains among members than either of the other harmonization measures-i.e., com-
mon fiscal or common monetary policy. This inference seems to find some support
in the general (static) theory of the economic effect of customs union.
Subject to all the limitations stemming from reliance on static models, the
following conditions might be taken as a summary statement of a preliminary
general theory :2
The over-all welfare effects of a customs union are the more likely to be beneficial:
A. The greater the gains from production expansion and trade creation; in turn,
such gains are the more likely to accrue in varying proportion to-
(x) The economic importance of the area to which the tariff agreement
applies. (The larger the area's share in world production, consumption,
and trade, with geographic size itself an important factor in this regard,
the greater will be the scope for such improvements as are generally
associated with and expected from higher degrees of international
specialization and reallocation of factor uses);
(2) The scope there is for "internal" economies of large scale production in
such industries as may expand their production as a result of the tariff
change;
(3) The difference in cost of production between the same industries in the
different member countries, where they were protected by tariffs prior
to the customs union arrangement;
(4) The level of the protective tariffs which are subjected either to preferential
reduction or complete elimination;
(5) The competition between member countries with respect to industries
enjoying high tariff protection, and the potential scope for developing
complementary industries after protection is removed from the industries
previously competing in the production of close substitutes; and
B. The smaller the losses from trade diversion; such losses being minimized in
varying proportion to-
(i) The dependence among the member countries and their lack of de-
pendence on the "outside" world. (If each member country is the main
supplier of exports to the other member countries and is the main market
'See especially J. VINRaa, THE CusToNs UNION Issue 54 (ig5o); J. E. MEADE, THE THEORY OF
CUSTOmS UNION 107 (1955); J. E. MEADE, THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY, II:
TRADE AND WELFARE (955). For a convenient summary, see R. SANNVALD & J. SToHERa, EcONOMIC
'INTEGRATION (1959). By introducing the concepts of "trade creation" and "trade diversion," Viner
showed that the effects of customs union as an arrangement for regional free trade need not point in
the same direction as the effects of universal free trade. If the customs union leads to shifts in imports from
low cost nonmember countries to imports from high cost member countries, the efficiency of resource
allocation will decline. To the extent that resource efficiency via product maximization enters the index
of universal economic welfare the effect of trade diversion through customs union reduces rather than
increases world economic welfare. For a prediction of the welfare effects of a customs union, then, it is
necessary to predict the relative strengths of the forces causing trade creation and trade diversion. See
Lipsey & Lancaster, The Geneal Theory-of Second Best, 24 Rav. EcON. STUD. I1 (1956).
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for exports of the other members, there is relatively little scope for damage
to third countries);
(2) The insensitivity to price changes of the supply from outsiders to the
member countries, and/or the insensitivity to price changes of the demand
by the member countries for imports from outsiders;
(3) A low level of tariffs both of the member countries and of third countries
in the lines of trade subject to the preferential tariff treatment. (In this
case there has never been very much scope for distortions of the patterns
of trade and production, so that the economic gains from a "correction"
are correspondingly slight);
(4) The extent to which trade restrictions consist of quantitative restrictions-
quotas. (Only as against either free trade or ineffective quotas can a
tariff be said to have any distorting effect at all.)
II
Although only two of the model conditions just recited are directly concerned
with the tariff as such, it is in each case the tariff which provides the frame of refer-
ence. Tariff rates, or rather the differences in tariff rates, serve as criteria for the
grouping of countries as "members" and "third countries"--as "insiders" and "out-
siders." It is as between these groupings that gains or losses are to be accounted
for. Therefore, the first inquiry will be concerned with the absolute and relative
level of tariffs under the provisions of the Rome Treaty.
This, of course, is not an area void of previous arrangements and still valid
commitments on the part of member countries vis-a'-vis the larger number of third
countries. On the contrary, bilateral obligations, sometimes of long standing,
and more recent commitments under the auspices of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.) precondition and limit the perimeter of action.
Indeed, it is still questionable whether the implementation of the Rome Treaty will
be allowed to follow the presently intended design. In particular, the question of
compatibility of the treaty with G.A.T.T. commitments remains under scrutiny, even
if its resolution can be postponed.
While any prediction of the outcome of continued negotiation remains speculative,
it is assumed that, in the absence of important shifts in power and leadership within
G.A.T.T., the present attitude of general acceptance of E.E.C. by the contracting
parties of G.A.T.T. will prevail long enough to allow the Common Market to con-
solidate on the basis of some form of preferential tariff arrangements. It is not,
however, taken for granted that the final position of complete customs union en-
visaged by the Rome Treaty will be reached;3 instead, consolidation may be found,
somewhere short of this goal.
Besides the possibility-and, indeed likelihood-of increasing pressures from third
-Complete customs union exists when internal tariffs are reduced to zero and uniform external tariffs
are established for all member countries. The revenues accruing from the common external tariff are
.pooled.
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countries, which might stop the E.E.C. short of its goal, the case for the customs
union itself must weaken during the transitional period. The additional economic
gains resulting from each step of internal tariff reduction will likely decrease,
whereas the losses to third countries will likely increase absolutely and/or relatively.
It is at this point that economic reasoning and wishful thinking most obviously
diverge. Too much in current thought, it would seem, has come to depend upon
the prediction of a mysteriously operating "internal dynamisme," sometimes more
urbanely dressed in expectations of supposedly inevitable "spill-over" effects. Partly
as an antidote to such exaggerated optimism, attention here is focused on the prob-
lems created-on the braking forces, rather than on the self-acceleration, of the
development towards customs union.4
As far as the tariffs of the member countries on imports from each other are
concerned, there is a reasonable presumption that the proposed timetable and the
zero tariff target can be realized. However, even in this basically internal sphere
a few snags remain-e.g., the problems of nonliberalized agricultural imports and
the problem of granting largely unilateral tariff concessions of the same magnitude
to the overseas territories. The timetable and the final level of the common
external tariff remain much more uncertain. The recent acceleration of the first
stage in aligning the outside tariffs of the four customs areas within the E.E.C.
toward the common external tariff and the conditional character of the over-all
reduction of this tariff by twenty per cent of its originally computed level are cases
in point. These uncertainties are emphasized still more by the fact that the common
external tariff has not been completed for all items traded. According to the report
of the E.E.C. Commission, seventy-two items, "representing less than three per cent
of the tariff lines," had not been agreed upon as of the reporting date. This report
does not indicate, however, how heavily these items weigh in the total imports of
the E.E.C. or in the total imports from individual nonmember countries. Without
such information, the eventual over-all incidence of the common external tariff
cannot be assessed.5
Apart from possible changes in policy as to time schedule and the "official" target
level of the common external tariff, there remain formidable statistical problems,
which make extremely hazardous any estimate of the likely effects of the common
external tariff on trade with third countries. These problems result largely from the
method chosen to compute the tariff. The present common external tariff is the
arithmetical average of the tariffs in each of the four customs areas on January 1,
1957. This method, which gives equal weight to the tariffs in each area, has invoked
much criticism. An alternative method, frequently suggested, would weight the
average tariff by the relative amount of imports into the different customs areas
'For examples of this argumentation in support of the treaty provisions, see R. SANNWALD & J.
STOHLER, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1959). For a discussion of the "spill over effects," see ERNST B.
Has, ThE UNIrNG OF EURoPE (X958).
'EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY COMM'N, TsmRD GENEIAL REPORT ON THE ACTIvITiEs Or THE
COMMUNITY 237 (5960). The common tariff, so far, has 2,893 lines. I
OStill other methods, of course, could have been employed with different weights and differin;
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Unfortunately, no reliable method of measuring, and, a fortiori, of predicting, the
effects of a tariff is available. Thus, even if it is agreed that there should be no
increase, and, if possible, a reduction in the over-all incidence of the tariff, there
remains some scope for differing opinions over the preferable method.
In defense of the method of computation employed, the E.E.C. Commission
rejects the criticism that the common external tariff violates the G.A.T.T. rules,
which, in addition to other conditions, permit customs unions only to the extent
that the common tariff resulting therefrom is not, in its effect, more restrictive than
were the national tariffs before the customs union was formed. The Commissior
reports in fact that the level reached is7
on the whole moderate. The weighted average rate resulting from its application to alE
the imports of the Community in 1958 amounts to 7.4 per cent. From this it follows that
the calculation of the tariff on the arithmetical average proved more favorable to non-
member countries than the weighted average would have done; though many people
favored this latter method, the resulting level would have worked out at 9.1 per cent.
Statistical problems of exact measurements aside, this level would compare with an
average level of 8.i per cent if the separate national tariffs, as applicable on January ir.
1957, were computed for the same (1958) volume of imports. In this case the com-
mon tariff would, indeed, appear as "moderate" and compatible with G.A.T.T. rules.
If the twenty per cent over-all reduction were actually to come into effect, the com-
mon tariff-weighted again in terms of 1958 imports-would amount to 6.i per cent.
Not all trading partners of the E.E.C. countries find this method of comparing
the average incidence of the tariff to be acceptable as a measure of changes in the
tariff's economic impact. It is true that E.E.C. imports in 1958 had declined from
their 1957 volume, so that the statistics on average incidence, on the whole, overstate,,
rather than understate, the restrictive effect of the tariff. However, even during this
year there were a number of cases-particularly cases involving nonmember countries
other than the United States-where exports to E.E.C. countries increased. Since
then, moreover, total imports have resumed their previous trend of substantial
annual increases. The average incidence, when computed in terms of the compara-
tively low 1958 imports, tends in these cases to understate the change in the
restrictive effect of the tariff.
A more basic criticism of the E.E.C. Commission's calculation of the external
tariff's incidence originated in the West German Ministry of Economic Affairs
degrees of economic reasonableness. For instance, instead of designating the Benelux countries as one
customs area, these countries might have gone into the average as three different areas; and since they had
the lowest over-all tariff level, this would have given them relatively more weight, thus turning the
average of the common tariff downwards. It perhaps would have been more reasonable to weight the
average according to the population within each area. Using this method, the weight given the Benelux
levels would have been half that given by employing the straight arithmetical method. Consequently, the
average tariff would have turned upwards.T E.E.C. Com'Nr, Tmu GENERAL REPORT, Op. cit. supra note 5, at 238. The later publication from
the statistical office of the E.E.C. quotes a weighted average rate of 7.6%. E.E.C. INFORMATIONS
STATISrIQUES 244 (196o).
8 E,.C. INFoRMATIoNs STATISTIQUES 244 (1960).
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-and was adopted by the Berliner Bank A.G. and by other important business groups
in Germany and outside the Community. It is argued that the Commission's calcu-
lations are distorted in their economic significance because they fail to distinguish
between protective tariffs on manufactures, tariffs on agricultural products, and
fiscal (revenue) tariffs. Only the first type, it is contended, can properly be con-
sidered in determining the actual restrictiveness of the tariff on imports. On this
basis, a seemingly persuasive case can be made that an increase is likely in the
effective incidence of the common tariff on imports from nonmember countries.
For German imports, which in 1959 accounted for approximately forty per cent of
all E.E.C. imports from nonmember countries, it is estimated by the Ministry of
Economic Affairs that, with due weight given to commodity composition, the aver-
age incidence of the tariff on imports from nonmember countries will increase by
1174 per cent. According to this method of calculation and taking into account
imports both from member and nonmember countries, the net increase in the tariff
incidence on manufactured goods imported to Germany will be around twenty-six
per cent.
This result depends primarily on the decision to exclude revenue and agricultural
tariffs from the computation. In fact, a few more tariff items were excluded, so
that approximately seventy per cent of manufactured imports actually remained
under consideration. Of course, for individual tariff items the rates are sufficiently
fixed and-within the limits of general uncertainties mentioned earlier in this article
-predictable for each stage of the transitory period. And, for the export-import
firm, while the overall tariff incidence problem cannot be said to be irrelevant, it cer-
tainly does not add anything basically different to the normal decision-making process.
The economist, however, faces a problem qualitatively different when he is called
upon to estimate the overall effect of tariff changes. The abstract character of the
averages involved is at the core of this problem; and, in the context of the contro-
versy mentioned here, the different possibilities for evaluating fiscal (revenue) tariffs
serve to highlight this point. It is by no means clear that their exclusion from the
overall estimate made by the German Ministry of Economic Affairs is more mean-
ingful economically than their summary inclusion in the E.E.C. Commission's
reports. And yet, at least in the case of Germany, one's judgment on this point
is the pivotal factor. In 1958, for instance, imports of crude petroleum brought
customs revenues of DM 450 million, as compared to DM 518 million of customs
revenues from imports of manufactures. Under the common tariff, the former im-
ports will be entirely free from duties; and so the average tariff rate as applied to
all imports could go down even if substantial increases of protective tariffs on manu-
factured imports went into effect.'0 The economic effects which really matter-the
9 Commodities covered by the E.C.S.C. and by Euratom were considered as independent from the
newly constituted tariff. This would seem acceptable enough if one were to take the realistic view that
only such changes caii be attributed to the new tariff as actually are determined by it. On the other
hand, E.C.S.C. and Euratom are parts of the same general project and should, therefore, be allowed to
enter into the evaluation of the final effecis of the Common Market.
10 Even if the 2o% reduction in the common taiff..is taken into account there will be a number of
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restriction of that category of imports which tends to grow most vigorously-would
be covered up under the E.E.C. Commission's method of computation. 1
Although the question of the proper treatment of revenue tariffs may be quite
ambiguous and deceiving in the short run, there is good enough reason to include
such tariffs in any long run analysis. The distinction between protective tariffs
and revenue tariffs is anything but rigid; given sufficient time, a revenue tariff may
well develop into a de facto protective tariff. This possibility will, of course, be
modified with respect to different commodities. A given country's endowment with
highly specialized production factors may well prevent a fiscal tariff from becoming,
in effect, protective. In general, however, there probably would be much wider
scope in E.E.C. for substitution of production factors-especially capital for labor-
and hence, for just such a transformation in the economic effects of a tariff. With
respect to the time required for such a substitution of factors, it is significant that
the length of the transitional period has been chosen specifically with a view to
allowing adjustments to fairly substantial (it is hoped!) changes in the industrial
structure of the member countries. If chosen adequately for this purpose, surely it
will also prove adequate for such adjustments as may be necessary to exploit pro-
tective possibilities of revenue tariffs, where they are found to exist. An example
would be provided by a tobacco tariff declared to be fiscal rather than protective by
a country with marginal production of tobacco; this country may, in terms of pro-
fairly substantial increases in individual tariff rates, especially in the countries of the low tariff areas,
Germany and Benelux. Based on Der Deutsche Gebrauchstarif 1959 and computed from a list published
by Berliner Bank A.G. Mitteilungen fdr den AussenhandeI 12. Jg.Nr. 3, 196o, the following cases are
quoted as examples. No attempt at weighting these cases for their relative importance in the total
imports has been made; the importance of individual items, therefore, varies considerably.
Item German tariff rates German tariff rates
in effect 1959 in the common tariff
Automobiles reduced by 2o%
(passenger cars) 13% 23%
Radio appliances,
receivers, and TV i 17.6
Electr. household
appliances 7 16
Machine tools 0-4 3.2- 9.6
Textile machinery 0-4 8.8-11.4
Printing machinery 0-4 8.8-12.8
Dairy machinery 4 8.8
Refrigerators 2-4 11.6
Leather footwear 8-13 I6
According to Berliner Bank A.G., Mitteilungen, Nr. 9/1o, 1960, p. 5, the list of tariff positions increased!
under the common external tariff contains about bo,ooo items. Most of these items refer to increases in
the tariff on imports into Benelux and Germany.
" Not even the E.E.C. Statistical Office claims that no such increases in effective rates and incidence
of the German tariff will result from the common tariff. In fact, it allows for an increase from 5.1%o
to 7.2% in the tariff incidence on German capital goods imports. This office does claim, however, that
the overall effect of the common tariff as applied to German imports as a whole will be a reduction
from (1957) 9.5% to 4.9% at the end of the transition. period. E.E.C. INFOMATIONs STATISrIQUES 247.
(x96o).
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ductive factor proportions available, be "unsuited" for tobacco production, if one
were to take as criteria for being suited the specific factor proportions employed in
:the typical tobacco-growing countries. A tariff in this case might make it possible
to produce tobacco in this country, since different factor proportions might then
become feasible.
Even in the short run, protective and fiscal tariffs may be quite indistinguishable
in their economic effects. Market responses to price changes may be induced equally
well by either type of tariff and, to the extent that the rates of revenue tariffs applied
to commodities are similar to those which prevail for protected commodities, the
consumption contraction effect of a tariff increase and the consumption expansion
effect of a tariff reduction will be similar.
In addition to the general problems of computing a common tariff and ascertain-
ing its effects, some specific complications influence the overall level and effect of
the E.E.G.'s common external tariff. For one thing, the common tariff is not com-
puted exclusively by the averaging method. Indeed, modifications have been intro-
,duced, some of which tend to lower and some to raise, the level of the tariff. The
Rome Treaty has seven lists (A-G) attached containing groups of commodities sub-
ject to special arrangements. These fall into one or the other of two categories:
those where entirely new tariffs were fixed, and those where tariffs other than the
ones actually in effect on January 1, I957, were taken as points of reference for com-
puting the average.
List A contains commodities for which the French tariff actually levied on Janu-
ary I, 1957, did not correspond to the tariffs then "on the books." The tariff in these
cases had been temporarily suspended or relaxed, and quantitative restrictions for
the time being controlled imports of the commodities in question. List A represents
what appears to be an economically, rather than legally, convincing solution; if the
restrictive effect of the tariff provides the criterion in formulating a common external
tariff, then it is quite reasonable to look for a tariff with a "restriction equivalent" to
the quantitative measures being employed. However, since in no other case have
;attempts been made to translate quantitative restrictions into corresponding "tariff
equivalents," the tariff rates fixed in list A seem rather arbitrary.'" The result is,
of course, a higher level of the common tariff than would have resulted from a
"legalistic" approach. With an average tariff of about twenty per cent for the
seventy-three items on List A (the tariff rates ranging from six to eighty per cent),
"aIn general, the E.E.C. Commission has takein the view that de facto rather than dc jure tariffs arc
to be used as bases for the averaging computation. But, in this regard, there may be some doubt as to
the-correct interpretation of the treaty itself. Articles i9-23--as translated into English-refer to duties
"applicable" or "applied" by the member nations. (The corresponding term in the German text is
"anwendbar.") Compliance with G.A.T.T. rules could be more easily demonstrated by the E.E.C. Com-
mission, the higher the base tariffs for the averaging could be shown to have been. Thus, the interpreta-
tion of the Treaty which is utilized may substantially affect the ease with which compliance with G.A.T.T.
can" be shown. Because of the divergence between de jure tariffs and actual restrictions on imports, it is
not surprising that compromises such as List A were reached. Cf. Jacobi, Der kommende gemeinsame
Zolltari# der EWG, 15 AussE'wiRuscHA-Tr 49 (ig6o).
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the corrected increase in the common tariff has been estimated at five per cent of the
tariff base, namely, the value of the imports. 3
Lists B, C, and D, on the other hand, seem to indicate downward modifications
of the results of simple averaging. These lists contain groups of commodities for
which tariff maxima have been fixed, which in some important cases remain below
the tariffs previously applied to the imports of such commodities into the indi-
vidual member countries. List E, modifying the result upwards again, contains
fictitious tariff bases for chemicals to "correct" for the fact that Benelux, having no
protective interest in these industries, in 1957, levied very low import duties on im-
ports, or none at all. Covering fifty-three items, this list is estimated to increase
the common tariff by two to three per cent of the tariff base.
More important modifications of the common tariff result from special treatment
of the groups of commodities in lists F and G. Here no attempt has been made
to apply simple arithmetical formulae; instead, these lists reflect negotiations and
policy decisions. List F contains commodities on which agreement among the
member countries actually had been reached when the Rome Treaty went into effect,
while list G contains those items which were then still under negotiation. The
former includes eighty-seven positions, with tariffs ranging from zero to eighty per
cent (eighty per cent for sugar imports), and covering mostly raw materials.
To the extent that previously applied tariffs are exceeded, the common tariff tends
to be raised, but there are sufficiently great individual reductions to leave unchanged
the general incidence on commodities in this group. There still remain seventy
positions on list G, which represent 15.6 per cent of total E.E.C. imports from non-
member countries in 1957. Raw materials account for two-thirds of these imports,
while the rest consists of foodstuffs and manufactured goods. "When these products
were studied," the E.E.C. Commission reports, "it appeared that the fixing of duties
gave rise to very serious difficulties because of their social and economic reper-
cussions. In addition to these difficulties, there were the divergent interests of pro-
ducer and consumer countries, which explains why some of the solutions arrived at
are of a mixed type."' 4 Furthermore, this is not a final list, as article twenty of the
E.E.C. Treaty provides for the adding of items to list G-with a limit of two per
cent of the total value of 1956 imports from third countries to the E.E.C. member
which requests the addition. Additions of this type have since been requested by
several member countries.' 5
With respect to several of the matters discussed, the situation will remain fluid,
pending the outcome of negotiations scheduled for the spring of i96i among the
contracting parties of GA.T.T. Until then an assessment of the effect of the
special treatment of commodities on the seven lists cannot be attempted. However,
" Giersch, Einige Probleme der Kleineuropdischen Zollunion, 113 ZEITscHrIUr PiE DIE GEsAMrE
STAATswissENcuFT 602-31 (1957). Giersch also calculates that similar distortions in the common
tariff, resulting from disregarding Italian tariff reductions or suspensions in force on' Jan. 1, 1957, have
increased the tariff base 2.75% .
x E.E.C. CoMm'N, TmR GENERAL REPORT, Op. cit. supra note 5, at 238.
'n So-called "lists G2."
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it does seem clear that the overall level of the common external tariff of the E.E.C.,
as it is submitted to the GA.T.T. parties, will be higher than an unbending
application of the averaging method would have led one to expect. This is not,
however, to say that the same is likely to be true for the common tariff as it will
ultimately emerge from the G.A.T.T. negotiations. In fact, a proposal for a twenty
per cent reduction of the common external tariff is already on the table. This
proposal, made by the E.E.C. Commission in connection with the acceleration of its
time schedule, remains provisional for the present, and subject to the condition of
reciprocity on the part of third countries. In effect, however, it is most likely that
this reduction will remain largely unilateral, since in many cases tariff agreements
between at least one of the member countries and third countries exist with respect
to the commodities in question. Compliance with article twenty-four, section six,
of G.A.T.T. will, then, substantially mitigate any such increases as may be implied
in the common external tariff. Under this provision, third countries are entitled to
compensation in any such case where rates on individual tariff items are increased.
Compliance with article twenty-four, section six, on the part of the E.E.C. seems
beyond doubt, even if at the beginning of negotiations the Community emphasizes
that it will enter such negotiations from a position of strength.'0
III
The problems mentioned here should make it sufficiently clear that-quite
apart from the uncertainties in the target rate and the target date of the common
external tariff-the computation of average rates of incidence remains somewhat
academic. This is not to say that the concept cannot be refined so as to gain real
economic meaning; but that such refinement could be achieved only after con-
siderable disaggregation of present data. To make an exact static analysis of the
price-quantity effects of tariff changes and of tariff differentials, one would need a
statistical device which, first, would measure both the regional (or country) and the
commodity concentration of trade flows and which, secondly, would combine these
measures in an index to show the degree of commodity specialization in regionally
concentrated trade.
This rather formidable task of statistical analysis cannot be undertaken here, nor
is it certain that at present the necessary statistical information can be obtained in
suitable form.' 7 However, since relationships of this kind tie in directly with the
general conditions determining the effects of the E.E.C. customs union on trade
"The Commission makes this sufficiently clear in its Third Report, op. cit. spra note 5, at 385.
No automatic compensation is here envisaged for each binding touched by the common tariff. "The
Commission will state in respect to each binding whether it considers it subject for negotiation. In many
cases, the increase of duties in certain tariffs are compensated by reductions in others; frequently this
internal compensation exceeds the compensation required, and in such cases the Community must be
given a credit to be set off in the negotiations on headings where the increases in duties outweigh the
reductions."
"'For the systematic problems involved in designing such an index of concentration, and for some
empirically derived concentration coefficients, both with respect to commodity and country concentration,
see Michady, The Shares of Countries in World Trade, 42 REv. EcoN. & STATisrrics 307 (1960).
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and economic welfare, it seems appropriate to point to some of the more obvious
instances of trade concentration-instances that will display important features in the
pattern of trade relationships between the E.E.C. and the rest of the world.
Considered together, the E.E.C. countries form the most important trading
bloc of the free world. With roughly one third of the United States Gross National
Product, they receive approximately twenty-two per cent of total world imports, as
compared with not quite nineteen per cent for countries of the European Free Trade
Association (E.F.T.A.) and approximately fifteen per cent for the United States.
At the same time, the E.E.C. countries account for more than twenty-four per cent
of world exports, compared with seventeen per cent for the United States and just
below seventeen per cent for the E.F.TA.'
The E.E.C. countries' importance as a world trading area increased strongly
during the i95o's and continues to increase at present. From i95o to 1959 the value
of imports into this area increased by 117 per cent, while total world imports ex-
panded slightly more than seventy-two per cent and imports into E.F.T.A. countries
sixty-nine per cent. More pronounced still was the gain in trade for E.E.C. exports,
which rose by a remarkable 171 per cent, with world totals increasing just under
seventy-one per cent and E.F.T.A. exports slightly more than seventy-one per cent.
These figures, of course, must be modified to reflect the share of intra-E.E.C. trade.
Once the alignment to the common external tariff is under way, the "intra-
trade" among E.E.C. nations can no longer be regarded as "foreign" in assessing the
position of the E.E.C. as a whole vis-a-vis the rest of the world. In 1959, intra-
trade of the E.E.C. countries accounted for about thirty-nine per cent of their total
trade; this reduces and alters the trade position of the E.E.C., both in terms of abso-
lute trade volume and in terms of shares in total world trade. In terms of actual
"external" trade, the E.E.C. ranks second in exports (although the difference between
the three trading areas-United States, E.E.C., and E.F.T.A.-is narrow) and third
in imports behind E.F.T.A. (first) and the United States. Even then, E.E.C. im-
ports from "outside" accounted, in 1959, for about one-sixth of the value of imports
originating in the rest of the world (i.e., total world imports minus intra-E.E.C.
trade). E.E.C. exports to nonmember countries accounted for more than one-fifth
of world exports. The pronounced increase in the ratio of intra-E.E.C. trade to
world trade provides, of course, the crucial gauge for measuring both the integrative
forces of regional free trade within E.E.C. and the disruptive forces brought to bear
upon the trade between E.E.C. and the rest of the world.
The E.E.C. countries have a much higher ratio of intra-trade to world trade
than do the countries associated under the Stockholm Convention in the E.F.T.A.P9
This difference is fundamental since it indicates that E.E.C. is relatively less de-
pendent than E.F.T.A. on imports from nonmembers. In light of the general
. The Soviet Area countries and Chinese Mainland are not included in "world" totals for lack of
sufficntly comparable statistics.
20 X959: E.E.C. intra-trade, 39% of world exports; E.F.T.A. intra-trade, x8% for exports and 16%
for imports. E.E.C. INFORMATIONS STATISrIQUES 250, 253 (1g6o).
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the'ory posited earlier, this justifies an optimistic view toward minimizing losses
ftrm trade diversion and damage to third countries. However, when the total ex-
ternal trade figures are itemized to show their regional and commodity composition,
it becomes clear that there is room for severe damage in some cases. Such damage
is especially likely to occur in trade between E.E.C. and E.F.T.A.
For an adequate comparison of the economic status of these two trading groups,
it is not enough to compare population, geographical size, total production, con-
.sumption, and the like. In terms of such comparisons the E.F.T.A. is certainly
the smaller of the two groupings; yet, in a per capita comparison, E.F.T.A. exceeds
the E.E.C. in output, consumption, and foreign trade. It may well be that these
latter magnitudes play a decisive part in determining the potential for further eco-
nomic growth and for the expansion of trade.
- The scope for damage to the trade between E.E.C. and E.F.T.A. resulting from
implementation of the customs union provisions in the Rome Treaty appears con-
siderable when present-and traditional-patterns of market interpenetration be-
tween the two areas are brought into focus. At least two countries (Germany and
the Netherlands) within the E.E.C.'s "low tariff areas" have substantial export
surpluses vis-a-vis E.F.T.A. countries. Moreover, in 1958, more than twenty-seven
per cent of German exports, twenty-five per cent of Dutch exports, twenty-one per
-cent of Italian exports, and thirteen per cent of French exports went to E.F.T.A.
countries.20
The importance of E.E.C. countries as markets for E.F.T.A. exports is even more
pronounced. In 1959, the ratios between exports to E.E.C. and exports to other
E.F.T.A. countries were these: Austria, 49.6:10.4 (this high ratio emphasizes the
political character of Austria's decision to join the E.F.T.A. and remain uncommitted
as to the political implications of E.E.C.); Switzerland, 39.0:15.4; Denmark,
31-7:40.3; Sweden, 31.o:35.o; Norway, 27.3:37.6; Portugal (not including overseas
territories) 24:17; the United Kingdom, 13.:13.0.21 Changes in this pattern
would seem inevitable under the provisions of both the Rome Treaty and the Stock-
holm Convention. Indeed, developments since 1953 indicate general shifts in trading
patterns already under way. While trade among Western European countries in-
creased on the whole by sixty-three per cent during this period, intra-E.E.C. trade
rose iio per cent, and intra-E.F.T.A. trade, thirty per cent. Significantly, although
intra-E.F.T.A. trade increased at a faster rate than E.F.T.A. export trade to the
E.E.C., it increased at a slower rate than E.E.C. export trade to E.F.T.A.22
While these statistics forebode losses to the participants in trade between E.E.C.
and E.F.T.A., they also indicate incentives for a "bridging of the gap" between these
-tvo highly interdependent markets. Since the deficit country-or the group of
Jdeficit countries-typically holds the stronger bargaining position vis-a1-vis a trade
- Source: 0:EE.C. STATiSTICAL BuLLErxN, S er. I (April 1959).
"Source: O.E.E.C. STATISTICAL BULLETIN, Ser. I (April x959), and Berliner Bank A.G.,-Mittcilungen
:fi" fen Aussenhandd No 6/59 (-x959).
11G.A.T.T., INTERNATioNAL TRAD" z959, at 148-51 "(196o)."
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partner vitally interested' in preserving his export markets, the E.F.TA., by reason
of it trade position, may be in a good position to negotiate a solution of some of the
problems created by the present customs union.
Two special features of the present situation make the prospects for successful
bargaining appear favorable. In the first blade, the present arrangement is meeting
with increasing dissatisfaction in the United Kingdom 3 A review of the economic
effects of imperial preferences on Commonwealth trade and a reappraisal of the
question of compatibility between British membership in E.E.C. and Commonwealth
ties might well alter British attitudes towards the customs unionY4 In a period of
vigorously expanding world trade, and even more vigorously expanding E.E.C.
trade, the gains to be foregone by the United Kingdom as a result of nonparticipation
in the Common Market may well appear an excessive price for the preservation of
Britain's special Commonwealth position'
Secondly, the prospect of losing important E.F.T.A. export markets has given
rise to misgivings in the Federal Republic of Germany. (German opposition to the
method used in calculating the common external tariff has already been mentioned)
Although Germany in terms of size and total output does not occupy the position
of economic dominance within the E.E.C. that the United Kingdom holds within
the E.F.T.A., it is not clear that this is the pivotal measure in assessing the weight
'3 The United Kingdom is singled out because of its general interest in the E.E.C. market. This is not
to suggest that other E.F.T.A. countries may not have similar or stronger interests in bridging the gap.
The ratios of their exports to E.E.C. countries to their exports to other E.F.T.A:- countries should make
this abundantly clear. If individual commodity groups of exports are considered, different industries
in. the E.F.T.A. countries have, of course, much more to lose than such over-all export ratios might
'suggest. Sweden, in 1957, exported 44% of its pulp and paper exports to E.E.t. countries, as compared
to 35% to E.F.T.A. countries (and as compared to a reverse ratio of total exports, i.e., 31*/: 35%).
Danish meat and egg exports figures illustrate this even more vividly.
"'A change in the British attitude towards customs unions would require rather strong motives. It
would mean, in the case of the United Kingdom, a reversal of firmly established conventions and principles.
It should be recalled, in this connection, that Great Britain in the past has been the firmest supporter
of the notion that customs unions are incompatible with the most-favored-nations principle. Cf. J.
VINER, THE Cusroxis UNION Issue 12 (950). However, as Professor Viner has pointed out, there is no
question that majority opinion and historical precedent favor arrangements whereby customs unions are
exempted from the most-favored-nations obligations.
Actually, one might assign a less important role to the most-favored-nations principle than does
Professor Viner. "The realization of a steady rate of growth, as little disturbed by cyclical fluctuations
as possible, and of other important goals of economic policy, is incompatible with an unlimited applica-
tion of the most-favored-nations principle." Pitz, Meistbegfinstigung, I HANDWFRTERBUCH DaR SozIAL-
wIssENsCRAFTEN 288 (i96o). [Writer's translation.]
With regard to Commonwealth trade and Imperial Preferences, compare THE EcoNoMisr INTELLIGENCE
UNrr, THE COMMONWEALTH AND EuRoPE (196o). The share of Commonwealth trade on which
preferential treatment makes for a substantial margin is comparatively small-approximately two-fifths of
total Commonwealth exports. United Kingdom exports to Commonwealth countries, on the other hand,
actually benefit more.
asA comparison of recent economic development in the United Kingdom and E.E.C. countries pro-
vides a good basis for the expectations herein expressed.
Based on figures for the first half of ig6o, British exports increased by io% in 1959-i96o, while the
index of change for E.E.C. countries was as follows: Benelux, i8%; Germany, 21%; France 34% -Italy,
4r%.
British industrial production rose by xo%; Benelux, 12%; Germany, 15%; Italy, 18%.
'The United Kingdom during the jear September 1959 'to September x96o, lost 5% of her gold
and foreign exchange reserves, while the E.E.C. countries together inereased stch reservei by 240%;
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of German influence.28 Rather the measure may depend on the share in trade of
the area as a whole. In this latter respect, Germany's position in the E.E.C. is similar
to the position held by the United Kingdom in the E.F.T.A. Moreover, Germany's
export surpluses with the smaller E.F.T.A. countries account almost exclusively for
the E.E.C.'s net creditor position vis-a'-vis the E.F.T.A.
In light of the German and British trading interests at stake, these factors may
create a bargaining atmosphere more conducive to compromise than could be ex-
pected with a more symmetric pattern of intra-European trade. So far, it has been
the policy of the E.E.C. Commission to offer "negotiations" with the United King-
dom on the condition that the provisions of the Rome Treaty are to be fully accepted
by any country joining the union. This position is likely to prove untenable; after
all, each of the treaty provisions is the result of lengthy negotiations between the
signatory countries. It would seem quite unreasonable to expect the United Kingdom
to join-if she so desired-without substantial bargaining and renegotiating of at least
parts of the treaty.
In trade with third countries-i.e., with countries which are neither E.E.C. nor
E.F.T.A. members-similar concentration patterns are evident. Although a further
breakdown according to the regional concentration of E.E.C. trade or the shares
therein of individual third countries cannot be attempted here, at least a general
indication of the commodity composition of such trade may be given2 The special
features of E.E.C. trade emerge best from a comparison with E.F.TA. countries'
trade with third countries.
E.E.C. imports from third countries in i959 exceeded corresponding E.F.T.A. im-
ports by slightly more than one billion dollars. Foodstuffs and manufactures, how-
ever, weighed more heavily in E.F.T.A. imports and actually exceeded E.E.C. imports
in value. The larger E.E.C. total, then, is wholly accounted for by the larger pro-
" At least one opinion should be quoted as not in concurrence with this quantitatively conceived
statement. E. STRAUSS, COMMON SENSE ABOUT THE COMMON MARKET (1958), Sees "the truc motive
forces behind the Rome treaty, in German interests. The unmistakable power centre of the new block is
the German Federal Republic directed by the rulers of German industry, which has successfully harnessed
the urges and aspirations of the dominant social forces and the hopes and fears of many people in
Western Europe to the service of a combination promising to be of great benefit to Western Germany
in general and to its business interests in particular." Id. at 7. After an excursion into the history of
the common market idea in German thought, the author concludes: "By committing the future of
European economic integration to the care of Western Germany, the signatories of the treaty . . . have
embarked on an unjustifiable gamble." Id. at 127.
For a more structured view of German industrial interests in the "integration," compare ERNST B. HAAs,
THE UNITING OF EUROPE 162-76 (x958).
Also, the more recent opposition of influential industrial groups in Germany against some of the
implications of E.E.C. tariff policy indicates a much looser connection between German interests and
E.E.C. than the political history of the treaty negotiations might suggest.
ITFor a detailed analysis of trade between E.E.C. and a number of individual third countries, see P.
EEDMANN & P. ROGGE, DIE EUROPXISCHE VI.TSCHAFTSGEMEINSCHAFT UND DIE DRIrTLXNDER (1960).
For E.E.C. trade with the United States, see Kreinin, European Integration and American Trade, 49
Am. EcoN. REv. 615 (1959). See also Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Report of the Special Study Mission
to Europe, H.R. REP. No. 1226, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (196o), and Hearings Before the joint Economic
Committee on Employment, Growth, and Price Levels pt. 5, International Influences on the American
Economy, 86th Cong., ist Sess. (x959).
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portion of crude materials imports2 With the exception of manufactures, imports
from third countries accounted for more than half of all commodity imports into both
the E.E.C. and the E.F.T.A. In short, only in manufactured goods is trade between
the E.E.C. and E.F.T.A. the predominant element, while for imports of foodstuffs
and crude materials both areas depend heavily on third countries. This dependence
is more pronounced in the case of the E.F.T.A. than of the E.E.C. However, with
respect to imports from the United States, the E.E.C. accounts for a larger absolute
value and a larger share. This is partly explained by the predominance of crude
materials imports among total E.E.C. imports, and also by the much larger E.E.C.
imports of American manufactures.29
These figures must, of course, be seen against the background of changing trade
relations between western Europe as a whole and the United States. What other-
wise might appear as trade diversion resulting from E.E.C. tariff policy may, after
all, represent nothing but a continuation of trends well under way before the
Common Market and for quite different reasons. With as much as forty per cent
of total American exports going to western Europe in 1928 and as little as seventeen
per cent in 1953, there is, indeed, a strong case for holding the latter view. Ob-
viously, with the disruption of trade in the world depression and during World
War II, there is little hope of uncovering the purely commercial "causes" under-
lying such changes. At any rate, in 1959, western Europe (the Organization of
European Economic Cooperation (O.E.E.C.) countries) received just under twenty-
five per cent of exports from the United States.
Only a breakdown of commodity composition will lead to some insight into the
prospective effects of the Common Market on trade with the United States. The
most important commodity group comprises foodstuffs, of which the O.E.E.C.
countries received forty-one per cent of the United States exports. In so far as
American exports of crude materials and manufactures were concerned, the O.E.E.C.
countries accounted for thirty-five and fifteen per cent respectively. Since agri-
cultural production in Common Market countries is expected to grow at approxi-
mately four times the rate of population growth, a declining E.E.C. share in total
American agricultural exports is easily foreseen. Even if the outcome of agricultural
integration in the E.E.C. remains uncertain and even if the development of Common
Market policies towards the overseas territories is regarded with some scepticism,
overproduction in grain seems most likely. Moreover, self-sufficiency in most other
"s Imports from third countries (in billions of dollars and percentage of total imports):
EX.C. E.F.T.A.
Foodstuffs 3.87 32% 4.41 40%
Crude Materials 6.53 54 4-73 43
Manlifactures 1.62 13 1.71 z6
Source. O.EE.C. FoREIGN TADE BULLETIN Ser. B and C (I96o).
29 E..C. countries in x959 imported more than twice the value of E.F.T.A. imports from the United
States in this category. In all three categories together, E.E.C. imports from the United States account
for 22% of the total commodity imports as compared to 17% in the case of E.F.T.A. In manufactures,
E.E.C. imports 14% more from the United States than E.P.T.A. O.E.E.C. FoREioN TRADE BULLETIN
Ser. B and C (ig6o).
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agricultural products of the temperate zones (other than'raw materia.ls) seems well
within the realm 'of possibility.80
Quantitatively more important to the United States are the prospects for exports
of crude materials to the E.E.C. In 1959, the E.E.C. accounted for twenty-five per
cent of American exports in this category, as compared to twenty per cent of food-
stuffs exportsf 1 In this commodity group, there seems to be relatively little room for
tariff discrimination, since the major portion will enter the Common Market duty
free. However, in some cases, such as coal and crude petroleum, special regulation
by the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community may effectively
limit the quantities allowed to enter the Common Market area. There is also a
tariff, ranging from two to five per cent, on vegetable oils and fats, products for which
the E.E.C. provides the largest United States export market, but the restrictive effect
is likely to remain negligible! 2 The only severe case of discrimination is aluminum,
with a tariff rate of ten per cent3
Decisively bleaker is the outlook for American exports of manufactured goods,
which by far provided the strongest tie in United States-E.E.C. trade as of x959.
However, the E.E.C. market accounts for only about ten per cent of total United
States exports in this category.
Were it not for the fact that American foreign economi6 policy remains com-
mitted to a program involving heavy unilateral spending abroad, one could certainly
donclude that "the impact of European integration on aggregate American produc-
tion is not likely to be significant; because foreign trade plays a relatively un-
important role in the American economy." 4 As it is, discrimination in manufac-
'0 Cf. FRZ BAAmE, DIE DEu-TSCHE LANDWIRTScHAFTsCHAFT im GEEINSAMEN MsiucT (1958). For
production possibilities and market conditions of grains, especially with regard to France and Tunisia, and
for a survey of E.E.C. grain policy proposals, see F. C. FABRE, LA 5'OL5TiQUE CgRfALIniE EN EUROPE AU
SEUIL DE L'UNzqcATo (AsPECTs EUROPkENS No. 3) (I96o).
.,
1 In 1928, this category accounted for 40% of United States exports as against 20% in 1959. From
1957 to 1959, United States exporp of crude materials decreased by 44%. Not all of this decrease can be
explained by a change in the relative availability of the products in this category. Part of the explanation
must be seen in the fluctuation of economic activity in Europe. It is in this respect that the much cited
dependence of Europe on cyclical fluctuations in the United States might well be reversed in the future,
if, indeed, such reversals might not already be observable. In 1958-59, the decline of crude material
exports from the United States coincided with i 6% increase in imports. The outstanding feature in that
period was, of course, the decline of 64% in iron and steel exports in consequence of the steel strike.
The relatively mild increase in iron and teel imports (20%) points to structural rather than cyclical
factors ("excess-capacity").
• The rates of 2 to 5% apply to inedible fats and oils, which are practically 'all the United States
exports to E.E.C, in this category, Higher rates apply to edible fats.
aSThe valu6,of aluminum exlorts in 1959 was approximately $20,000,000.
"' Kreinin' "supra note 27, at 626. The estimates offered by this author place the share of total
Unit d States exports likbly" to be injured by the E.E.C. at 5%. Mr. S. Stewart, of the British Board
of Trade, in an unpublislid:paper, estimates that 20 to 30% of total United States exports are likely to b
aff&ted. This drasticall§ "different esinate occurs becaus this author gives more weight to the' fact
that, in 1959, of total imports of engineerihg produts into the O.E.E.C. co ntris from third cotintries,
13% originated in' the United States. Furthermore, since the low tariff areas of the E.E.C. accounted
for more than half of these imports, the tariff increases must be expected' to have especially strong
impact. As Germany accounts for as much engineering production as the rest of the E.E.C. countries
together, the internal tariff elimination will also be more likely to have stronger effects upon trade in'.
this commodity group with the United States. 
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tures-the very category of exports in which the United States has shown the most
promise for production and trade expasiona--may come to bear more heavily on
the American economy than would be suggested by the relatively small role exports
play in creating United States national income. The result will depend largely upon
the possibility of expanding American exports to other countries, as the United
States has already done with some of its manufactured goods. On the whole, a
comparison of American export performance with that of Western Europe tends
to be prejudiced by the large share of western European exports accounted for by
Germany. The special factors underlying West German economic growth, and par-
ticularly the special stimuli provided for German exports by an export-conscious
governmental policy, do not justify any prima facie conclusions concerning the
commercial competitiveness of United States exports.
Any attempt at forecasting the long-run effects of E.E.C. integration must place
the present pattern and any short-run changes in trade relationships between E.E.C.
and the rest of the world into the context of past developments and the potential
for economic growth. Such a task is formidable, because potential growth in E.E.C.
economies may depend markedly on the effects of integration itself; indeed, the
rationale of the whole venture is to achieve such integration effects. At best, from the
forecaster's point of view, hitherto observable trends will continue along established
paths, and the "integration effect" will come into play only with the "official" begin-
ning of the step-by-step integration schedule. At worst, the E.E.C. provides an
altogether unique case, with patterns of development determined by the special
features of the participating countries and with the "integration effect" largely pre-
empted by anticipatory adjustments of economic activity within the Community and
in third countries.
Many factors point to the latter possibility-the rather unique structure of E.E.C.
trade and the strong influx of foreign capital into the Common Market providing the
more obvious illustrations. Accordingly, the various forecasts on rates of economic
growth within the E.E.C. differ widely: most estimates concur, however, in placing
the minimum average annual growth rate at 3. per cent. 0 If due consideration is
" Exports in metal manufactures and railway vehicles to markets other than Western Europe or
Canada increased between 1953 and 1958. Exports of chemicals, aircraft, and paper increased even in
-western European markets. See U.N. EcoNoMic Comtm'N FOR EUROPE, EcoNOMiC SURVEY oF EUROPE 1j
1959, 13-X5 (E/ECE/ 3 83 ) (U.N. Pub. Sales No.: 6o.II.E.i). U.S. DEP'T oF CommEncE, SuRvEy oir
CURRENT BUsINEss i (Dec. ig6o), reports a steep increase in the over-all merchandise trade surplus
during the third quarter of x96o. Steel, cotton, and aircraft exports accounted for almost two-fifths of
the expansion in exports. Passenger cars, copper, and aluminum contributed an additionail one-fourth
,of the total improvement in the United States balance of merchandise trade.
"' The G.A.T.T. Secretariat forecasts an increase in GNP by 9o% over the period 1953-55-1973-75
for the E.E.C.; see The Possible Impact of the European Economic Community, TRADE INTELLIGENCE
-PAPER No. 6 (1957). The average annual growth rate, in this case, would- be 3.3%. This estimate was
amended to take into account a special integration effect on growth. The total GNP increase over-the
same period was placed at a minimum of i2o% and a maximum of 150%, with average annual rates of
4.0% and 4-7%. 7
The List GeselIsehaft, Research Department (Basle), in a more recent estimate, gives a figure of z3%
-for the total increase in GNP from 1955 to 1975, and an average annual rate of 3.8% This forecast
places the prospective annual rate for the period 1955-65 at: 4,3%,,'and for the period x965-75 at 3.4%.
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given to the special factors determining the growth leaders of recent years and to
the fact that growth leadership shifts from country to country,"7 this conservative
estimate appears quite acceptable.
When even the minimum projected E.E.C. growth rate is compared with such
rates in nonmember countries, substantial differentials are likely to appear, 8 which,
however, need not adversely affect trade. Rising national incomes and reversals in
the terms of trade may well result in nonmember countries receiving a bigger share
of trade gains. However, such optimistic results will come about only under special
conditions in the world trade structure, which recent developments in international
trade indicate: do not exist. In the first place, the unusually high rate of annual
increases in the volume of world trade (six to eight per cent over the 1948-1958
period) cannot be expected to continue very long. Secondly, the danger of trade
diversion damage is aggravated by the long-run tendency for trade between in-
dustrial countries and nonindustrial countries to decline relative to total world
tradeP' Thirdly, the long-run tendency towards regionalization may well continue
fo prevent an optimal pattern of trade between the E.E.C. and other industrialized
countries, including the United States' 0
P. ED ANN & P. ROGGE, DIE EtuopXiscHE WIRTSCHAPTSGEMEINSCHAPT UND DIE DRIrrLXNDR 133
(i960). (These authors also list and analyze forecasts given by other official and private institutions.)
As to the more immediate prospects, Mr. Robert Marjolin, Vice President of the European Economic
Community, in a speech on Jan. ig, I96i, predicted a rate of 4 to 5% in real GNP for 196i, which
compares to a rate of almost 7% realized in 196o. European Community, Information Service, Wash-
ington, D.C., Jan. 23, I96I.
" At present, the shift appears to be from Germany to Italy and France. See note 25 supra. For the
problems encountered in analyzing the factors determining economic growth in Germany, see Sohmen,
Competition and Growth: The Lesson of West Germany, 49 Am. Ecou. REv. 986 (x959), and the
comments on this article, especially by Roskamp, 50 id. at iox5 (196o).
"
8 G.A.T.T. estimates an average annual growth rate of 2.6% for the European countries outside
E.E.C. See The Possible Impact of the European Economic Community, supra note 36.
11 Cf. P.L. YATES, FoRTY YEAns OF FOREIGN TRADE 56 (1959).
0 EmiK TnoaBEaez, THE TENDENCY TowAnDs REGIONALIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 1928-x956
(g6o) argues that monetary and political forces, rather than tariff barriers, have brought about an in-
creasing degree of regionalization in international trade. Three regions examined by Thorbeckc are the
O.E.E.C., the Sterling Area, and the Dollar bloc. Intra-regional trade as a ratio of total trade of these
areas is found to have increased from 48.8% in 1928 to 57.8% in x956 for exports, and from 4.6%
to 51.4% for imports. As a ratio of total world trade, intra-regional trade increased from x.6% to
z8.8% for exports, and from x5.o% to 19.o% for imports. The author concludes "that the rise in
intraregional trade which took place between 1938 and 1956 within the smaller European countries re-
flets to a large extent a more efficient use of the existing natural complementarity, which was made possible
by significant changes in the over-all state of technology." Id. at 126. It is largely on the basis of
technological considerations that Thorbecke gives a rather optimistic outlook on the effects of the E.E.C.
He assumes a rather substantial scope for economies of scale and the concomitant improvements in
resource productivity. Other authors are much more skeptical with respect to foreseeable economies of
scale. Cf. Johnson, The Economic Gains from Freer Trade with Europe, The Tree Banks Review,
Sept. 1958, p. 9, and P. ERnmaNrNr & P. Roo, DIE EuRoPXiscHsE ViRTsCHAirsoEMEINscsAvT uND Dirn
DRaIs.L-Elt 35 (1960).
This asymmetrical pattern of world trade expansion was repeated in' European trade; and with the
resumption in x959 of a high rate of economic growth, western European trade continued to expand
vigorously. While intra-European trade accounted, on the whole, for the biggest share, the less in-
dustrialized western European countries were "hardly touched" by this trade expansion. "Increase
countries," on the other hand, accounted for 73% of the intra-European imports, and for nearly 8o%
of the increase in such exports. U.N. ECONOMIC COMM'N FOR EUROPE, EcoNoMIC SURVEY OF EuRoPE iN
1959, at 7 (E/ECE/383) (U.N. Pub. Sales No.: 6oa-I.E.x).
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Here again, the impact of the E.E.C. upon trade with nonmember countries
cannot be judged by aggregate statistics, for the effects on the group of non-
industrialized or less industrialized countries as a whole do not determine the results
for individual countries in the group. Growth rate differentials within the group
may worsen the trade position of individual countries. As to the commodity com-
positions of these countries' trade, there exist, of course, as many terms of trade
as there are pairs of commodities traded~l
Even if sufficiently specific information can be obtained about the effective
rates under the E.E.C. common external tariff, and if the structure of trade between
the Common Market countries and outsiders is sufficiently analyzed, the likely effects
of the E.E.C. tariff remain uncertain. Price effects are directly proportional to tariff
changes only in the case of perfectly competitive markets in trade participating
countries. If imperfections exist, tariff changes are much less likely to be trans-
mitted to prices. Both lack of sensitivity to price changes on the side of demand
and the ability to engage in some measure of "price policy" on the side of supply
would account for such possibilities. In either case the theoretically possible price
effects would be of different magnitudes for changes within different price ranges.
On the other hand, tariff changes are likely to have stronger price effects than the
general theory would suggest, since customs evaluation practices, as a rule, are such
as to reinforce the price effects of tariff changes.4
With respect to the "welfare effects" resulting from a comparison of "trade-
creating" and "trade-diverting" effects of the E.E.C. customs union, there is some
room for doubt whether the preferential tariff arrangement of this customs union
will disturb the optimal economic pattern of world trade. Particularly with respect
to the postwar period and in light of some fairly obvious disparities in foreign ex-
change rates, there is little to suggest that trade flows actually correspond to any
such optimal pattern, either in the direction or in the commodity composition of
trade. Of course, as was shown above, this statement does not mean that serious
"The "terms of trade" concept, as usually employed in analyses of changes in a country's trade posi-
tion, is a highly aggregative statistical device involving index numbers. It does not directly measure
gains or losses from trade. These are measured only by changes in net income. Cf. Flexner, An Analysis
of the Nature of Aggregates at Constant Prices, 41 REv. EcoN. AND STATsrlcs 400 (1959).
Terms of trade have been found to favor developed countries as against underdeveloped countries in
the long run. The empirical record does not, however, show that terms of trade moved at the same time
in favor of manufactures and against primary products, as might have been expected. Cf. C. P. KINDLE-
BERGER, Tim Tawis oF TRADE: A EuRoPEAN CAsE STUDY 253 (1956). This, too, would suggest extreme
caution with respect to generalizations on the basis of aggregative terms of trade concepts.
See also G.A.T.T., INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1959, at 36 (596o): "Changes in terms of trade gave
North America and Western Europe an increase in real national income which can (for the period
1953-58) be roughly estimated at about $2,8oo million at 1953 prices. At the same time, however, the
changes in terms of trade decreased the import capacity, and probably also the imports, of the non-
industrial areas by about $5,7oo million, resulting in a net gain from improved terms of trade for the
industrial areas of about $Si,ooo million."
" This is especially true for the treatment of discount, rebate, and certain tax compensations upon
crossing a customs barrier. The customs duty is in such cases usually added to the "custom value" on the
basis of which it has been computed. The compensation is then charged as against this higher "base
value," and has, therefore, a cumulative effect on price. Cf. Jfirgesen, Die Wirtschalisgem-einschaft im
Freihandelsraum, I J.nRuca FU-R SOZIALWIssENScHA'r 53 (1959).
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damage is unlely to occur in individual (industry or country) cases. It is sug-
gested, however, that such damage often occurs only because industries or countries
have adapted themselves to patterns of trade which are far from optimal and, there-
fore, basically unstable.
Also, it must not be assumed that tariffs always have been the major factors
in distorting international trade.- Indeed, quantitative restrictions and exchange
controls during the post-depression period may well have been the more important
instruments in restricting and 'rechanneling international trade a In this con-
nection it is significant that the E.E.C. treaty does not contain any direct provisions
for the removal of quota restrictions on trade with nonmember countries. Although
the treaty provides for lifting quotas in intra-E.E.C. trade along with the step-by-step
elimination of tariffs, nonmember countries must rely for relief on the general com-
mitment of the E.E.C. Commission to the principles of a "liberal" commercial
policy. "
There remains, then, an impbrtant reservation whatever the structure of trade
between E.E.C. and nonmember countries, and whatever the final rates of the E.E.C.
external tariff, the establishment of a customs union among the six countries of the
European Economic Community is no substitute for other tasks of common economic
policy.
SThe assumption that the effective rates of tariffs just "fit" the relative cost situation of trade
competing industries, and therefore give a correct measure of protection and trade restriction, would
imply a presumed economic rationality in the use of the tariff, and in the fixing of its rates, which
neither the normal administrative procedures nor the actions of interest groups promoting a tariff seems
to warrant.
"'Certain quota concessions were made by the E.E.C. to G.A.T.T.-member countries in x959.
At present, a complaint by Australia against the agricultural quota set by the Federal Republic of Germany
is pending under G.A.T.T. procedure. See Die Welt, Feb. 25, ig6i, p. 7.
